The International Herald Tribune headline said it all: “Bush gives India a hug, Pakistan a friendly pat.” President Bush’s recent South Asian trip officially confirmed India’s status as America’s strategic partner. India got the much coveted civilian nuclear deal, which assures US cooperation in India’s use of nuclear technology to meet the country’s burgeoning demand for energy. Pakistan’s claim to a similar deal was firmly turned down and although Bush praised General Musharraf’s efforts in the war against terrorism, he did not say or do anything else to cheer either Musharraf or the rest of official Pakistan.
A highly visible visit by the head of state of the world’s sole superpower would please many government, especially when accompanied with promises of continued economic and military assistance. But Bush’s praise for Musharraf during his Islamabad stop-over, and the fact that Pakistan got a state visit from a US president, were insufficient to fulfil Pakistani expectations.
Successive military leaders in Pakistan have sought alliance with the US as a means of overcoming the power imbalance between India and Pakistan as well as to push for Pakistan’s case over J&K Musharraf is no exception. The Pakistani generals’ formula for befriending the US is simple. Pakistan offers strategic cooperation to the US in addressing its immediate policy concern: containing Soviet communism during the Cold War; providing Afghan Mujahideen a base of operations in the war to bleed the Soviets; and, since 9/11, intelligence sharing and military action against Al-Qaeda. In return, they invariably seek to advance their own goal of “containing” India.
Since the ’50s, when Pakistan and the US first became allies, US assurances of a settlement of the Indo-Pakistan dispute over J&K has often been the touchstone of US fidelity for Pakistan’s rulers. Now, when the US considers India a strategic partner, US pronouncements on Kashmir are nothing more than reminders that the parties to that dispute need to settle it some time soon. Had Bush said something more on J&K, Musharraf could have used it as a face-saver. He decided, however, to stick to his script and avoided saying anything that Musharraf could describe as an offer of American mediation over Kashmir.
As expected, Bush did not press Musharraf very hard on the question of restoring democracy, at least publicly. But he did not leave the issue unaddressed either. In expressing the hope that “democracy is Pakistan’s future”, he refuted Musharraf’s assertions that Pakistan is already on the road to democracy.
Realistically speaking, there was little reason for Pakistani officials to expect anything different. But Pakistan’s military rulers have a long history of deluding themselves and building unrealistic hopes. Pakistan had been told long before the Bush visit not to expect a civilian nuclear deal comparable to India’s. In any case, Pakistan had not shown any interest in American civilian nuclear technology until the deal with India was announced a few months ago. The demand for a civilian nuclear agreement was not based on demonstrated energy needs or prior consultation between Pakistan and the US. It was a case of asking to be treated exactly as the US deals with India.
The most memorable statement of Bush’s trip came at its end. “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories,” Bush said at his joint press conference with Musharraf. Almost every US leader and official dealing with the two countries has had that thought but the hesitation in stating it has often fed unrealistic expectations among Pakistanis.
The visible disappointment in Pakistan over Bush’s visit is not the result of US unreliability, as several Pakistani commentators are claiming. It is the consequence of the persistence of strategic myopia within the Pakistani establishment. Bush deserves credit for being straight-forward in his statements throughout his South Asia trip. He carefully and scrupulously avoided feeding false hopes in Pakistan.
In the past, carefully worded US ambiguity was used by Pakistani generals to claim the US let them down by not helping them in their adventures. Musharraf is already venting anger against India and the Afghan president for not letting his courtship with the US result in a marriage on Pakistan’s terms.
But Pakistanis must come to terms with the fundamental flaw in their strategic paradigm instead of periodically lashing out at others, especially the US. A nation should not define its interests solely in terms of competing with a much larger neighbour. Pakistan has already suffered enough as a result of its efforts to use periodic alliances with the US to challenge India. This might be a moment to consider a new strategic vision, one which takes advantage of close Indo-US ties to forge a partnership simultaneously with India and the US.
Instead of acting as the prickliest nation in South Asia, Pakistan could then be the friend of its immediate neighbors as well as of the world’s sole superpower. Pursuit of economic prosperity and political stability under democracy, rather than the “containment” or “cutting down to size” of India would be a better strategic goal for Pakistan.
Unfortunately, Musharraf has already indicated that he is not considering any changes in the old Pakistani view.
Husain Haqqani is director of Boston University’s Center for International Relations
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